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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
PETRUS FAMILY TRUST DATED MAY 1,
1991, and EDMOND A. PETRUS, JR.,
individually and as Co-Trustee of the Petrus
Family Trust Dated May 1, 1991,
Plaintiffs/Appellants/Cross-Respondents,
v.
CHRIS KIRK dba KIRK ENTERPRISES,
Defendant/Respondent/Cross-Appellant,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court Docket No.
0044784-2017
Valley County District Court Case
No. CV-2014-71-C

CROSS-APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District for Valley County
Honorable Judge Jason D. Scott, Presiding
Amy A. Lombardo, ISB No. 8646
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 W. Main St., Ste. 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 562-4900
Attorneys for Appellants, Petrus Family Trust
and Edmond A. Petrus, Jr.

John Morris (Pro Hac Vice)
Rachel E. Moffitt (Pro Hac Vice)
HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
401 W. A Street, Ste. 2600
San Diego, CA 92101
Telephone: (619) 236-1551
Attorneys for Appellants, Petrus Family Trust
and Edmond A. Petrus, Jr.

C. Tom Arkoosh, ISB No. 2253
Daniel A. Nevala, ISB No. 6443
ARKOOSH LAW OFFICES
802 W. Bannock St., Ste. 900
P.O. Box 2900
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5105
Attorneys for Respondent/Cross-Appellant
Chris Kirk d/b/a Kirk Enterprises
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Reaching a decision to award attorney fees without an exercise of reason or outside the
boundaries of a district court’s discretion is an abuse of that discretion. The district court in this
case properly understood that awarding fees to Chris Kirk dba Kirk Enterprises (“Kirk”) was
within its discretion. The district court also properly understood that Kirk was entitled to an award
of fees for defending against a frivolous claim. The problem, however, is that the district court’s
actions, in awarding Kirk a small percentage of the total fees incurred in defending against the
frivolous claim, are not logically supported by the explanation provided in the court’s written
decision. Therefore, because the court explained that the fees incurred by Kirk in defending
against both the frivolous and non-frivolous claims were indivisible, the district court did not reach
its apportionment decision through an exercise of reason or within the outer boundaries of its
discretion.
II.

ARGUMENT

A. The logical disconnect between the language and reasoning of the district court’s
decision and the amount of fees actually awarded to Kirk indicates either a failure to
reach the decision through an exercise of reason, a failure to act within the boundaries
of the court’s discretion, or both.
The district court’s apportionment decision was based, at least in part, on the court’s
subjective belief that because Kirk’s counsel did not file an early dispositive motion on the nonfrivolous claim, regardless of the ramifications of losing that motion, that Kirk was not deserving
of a fee award for the time spent defending against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1156. Even
though the court considered Petrus’ argument supporting the non-frivolous claim and his
interpretation of the accrual rules and statute of limitations rules to be considerably weaker than
Kirk’s argument, the court explained that Petrus framed the issue as one of first impression. R.
Vol. 1, p. 1154-1155. So, because Kirk did not seek an early dismissal of a non-frivolous claim,
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that the district court believed presented an issue of first impression, the court penalized Kirk by
severely limiting the fee award he received for the fees incurred defending against the frivolous
claim. The logical disconnect between the district court’s actual fee award and the reasons
expressed in the language of its supporting opinion equates to an abuse of discretion through a
failure to exercise reason and failure to act within the boundaries of the court’s discretion.
In its fee apportionment to Kirk, the district court explained that fee-shifting under I.C.
§12-121 was appropriate with respect to the non-frivolous conspiracy-to-defraud claim. R. Vol. 1,
p. 1154. Typically, in any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is
which party prevailed. The district court properly answered that question, Petrus did not appeal
the question, and it is not contested at this point. Thus, no further analysis of that threshold question
is required. Kirk was the prevailing party and was entitled to an award of fees under I.C. §12-121
for defending against the frivolous conspiracy claim.
The district court properly understood that Kirk was entitled to a fee award for defending
against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. The court expressed no confusion over whether
fees had been incurred in defending against the frivolous claim. R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. In fact, the
court clearly expressed its understanding that “almost all of the work that was necessary to defend
against the conspiracy-to-defraud claim to also have been necessary to defend against the impliedwarranty claim.” R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. The court also went on to state that “most of the work pertained
to both claims indivisibly or to the implied-warranty claim in particular” R. Vol. 1, p. 1155. This
language is broad. The use of the phrases “almost all” and “both claims indivisibly” indicate that
the court understood that the work was performed defending against both claims. Further, the
language used by the district court does not indicate that it perceived the indivisible work to be
limited to discovery issues as Petrus suggests. Petrus did not voluntarily drop the conspiracy claim
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after discovery unveiled its frivolousness. The claim was successfully defended by Kirk through
the filing of a summary judgment motion. Not until the actual summary judgment hearing, after
failing to provide any argument supporting the claim in its briefing, was Petrus forced to stop
pursuing the frivolous conspiracy claim.
How, then, did the district court conclude that Kirk was only entitled to an award of seven
percent of his total fees incurred? Even after the court had concluded that most of the time spent
defending Kirk was spent defending both a frivolous claim and a non-frivolous claim, and further,
that the defense of the frivolous claim took the litigation process through discovery and the
summary judgment stage of this lawsuit. Respectfully, it is submitted that the district court did not
reach its decision through an exercise of reason or within the outer boundaries of its discretion.
The court did not state that it was unable to determine from the record which fees were
attributable to the defense of the frivolous claim and which fees were attributable to the defense of
the non-frivolous claim. If this had been the case, then denying Kirk’s fee request in whole, or
making a small award, may have been proper. As this Court explained in Brooks v. Gigray
Ranches, Inc., if a district court is unable to separate, and determine from the record, which claims
the attorney fees were incurred defending, denying a fee request is proper. See, Brooks v. Gigray
Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72, 78, 910 P.2d 744, 750 (1996). Our situation is different. The district
court explained its approach as a careful review of the record, a determination that equal work was
done defending both claims, and then somehow still determined that a seven percent award was
proper.
How have other courts defined an abuse of discretion? Courts from around the country
have held that in general, a trial court abuses its discretion where its order is clearly against the
logic of the circumstances, is arbitrary and unreasonable, and indicates a lack of careful
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consideration; where the court has acted arbitrarily without the employment of its conscientious
judgment; where there is an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable attitude on the part of the
court; or where the court acts without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Discretion also
is abused where manifest injustice has been done, where the appellate court has a definite and firm
conviction that the lower court erred, where there has been a deprivation of rights, or where the
judgment is the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. 5 C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 907.
Using these general definitions as a guide, the district court’s decision to award Kirk seven percent
of his total fees after explaining that most of the work pertained to both claims indivisibly, but that
defense counsel should have filed a dispositive motion earlier in the case on the non-frivolous
claim, equates to an abuse of discretion under a number of the above definitions. The district court
either failed to reach its decision through an exercise of reason, or through action outside the
bounds of the court’s discretion, or both. Either way, the issue of apportionment of fees should be
remanded so the district court can reanalyze its decision.
Had the district court fairly applied the logic expressed in its opinion, that the services
provided by Kirk’s counsel in defending against the frivolous claim equaled the services spent
defending against the non-frivolous claim, a reasonable attorney fee award to Kirk would have
very likely been closer to fifty percent of the fees incurred, not seven. This, coupled with the
district court’s expression of displeasure with defense counsel’s strategic choice of foregoing the
early filing of a motion to dismiss the non-frivolous claim, which the court perceived as an issue
of first impression, and instead proceed through discovery and summary judgment, equates to the
court improperly substituting its judgment for that of the litigants and counsel and imposing a
penalty for not viewing the litigation through the same lens as the court.
For these reasons, we respectfully request that this Court take the opportunity to remedy
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the error by remanding and allowing the district court the opportunity to reassess its decision and
reapportion the fee award to Kirk through a proper exercise of reason within the bounds of its
discretion.
B. Fees should be awarded to Kirk.
Petrus has not made a reasoned argument as to why the law should evolve in the direction
he suggests. Instead, he has filed an ill-reasoned appeal, for an ill purpose, based on a strained
reading of Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37, 740 P.2d 1022 (1987). The district court
properly rejected Petrus’ attempt to convert a breach of implied warranty of habitability claim,
sounding in contract, into a tort claim to avoid application of the appropriate contract statute of
limitations. The argument is entirely self-serving for Petrus. Its acceptance does not advance Idaho
warranty law or provide any compelling reason for a change in the law. As previously explained
in the Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s Brief, the economic loss doctrine absolutely stands in the
way of Petrus recovering from Kirk. As do other valid legal arguments that were presented below
but not considered or written about in the summary judgment decision. Petrus knows this. He
chooses to ignore this and argues that none of this applies. That argument fails. This appeal was
brought and pursued for frivolous reasons, not in some effort to help Idaho develop the law.
With regard to the cross-appeal, the district court’s expressed logic does not match its
action. The failure to exercise reason and act within the bounds of its discretion is an abuse of
discretion for which this Court should take action. That action should be a remand back to the
district court.
For these reasons, we respectfully ask the Court uphold the law expressed in Tusch, and
not alter the course of Idaho law for years to come so that only Petrus can benefit. An implied
warranty claim sounds in contract, not tort. We further ask the Court to remand the fee award back
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to the district court for review and reapportionment.
III.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons and the reasons expressed in Respondent/Cross-Appellant’s
Brief, the Court should affirm the decision awarding summary judgment to Kirk, find that the
district court abused its discretion and remand the award of attorney fees back to the district court
for review and reapportionment, declaring Kirk the prevailing party on appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day of November, 2017.
ARKOOSH LAW OFFICES

____________________________________
Daniel A. Nevala
Attorney for Chris Kirk d/b/a Kirk Enterprises
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of November, 2017, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document(s) upon the following person(s), in the manner indicated:

John Morris, Esq.
Rachel E. Moffitt, Esq.
HIGGS FLETCHER & MACK LLP
401 West “A” Street, Suite 2600
San Diego, CA 92101-7913
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

______
x
______
______
______
______
x

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Courier
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (619) 696-1410
E-mail jmmorris@higgslaw.com
moffittr@higgslaw.com

Amy A. Lombardo
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
800 W. Main Street, Suite 1300
Boise, ID 83702
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants

______
x
______
______
______
______
x

U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Overnight Courier
Hand Delivered
Facsimile (208) 562-4901
E-mail
alombardo@parsonsbehle.com

____________________________________
Daniel A. Nevala
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